Is 1 + 1 2 an ultimate truth

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My writings have been called a school of suspicion, even more of contempt, fortunately also of courage, even of daring. In fact, I myself do not believe that anyone has ever looked into the world with equally deep suspicions. (MA I, Vorr. 1) 1

1Nietzsche's deepest suspicion hits the possibility of truth. Affected by nihilism of the 19th century, he sees his “own task” in “trying to question it” (GM III 24), and in its redefinition he radically changes the foundations of philosophy. Nonetheless, his “revaluation” had little direct effect on the prevailing philosophical currents of the 20th century, on hermeneutics, phenomenology and philosophy of science, on existential philosophy and anthropology, philosophy of language and critical theory. Its reception was not only made more difficult by the fact that it was not fully visible in the aphoristic work and the notes of the estate, it also remained through its assignment to a "philosophy of life" with a smell of noncommitment and through the pathetic, demoniac-shrouded title of Eternal Return and burdened with the Dionysian affirmation. Most of all, however, its effect stood in the way of its own consistency, which forbade it to become a systematically formulated doctrine. In his overview of “Truth as a Problem” 2, Joseph Möller grants Nietzsche's redefinition an important place in historical development, but only occasionally takes it into account in the systematic part, L. Bruno Puntel's “critical-systematic presentation” of the “theories of truth in modern philosophy “3 does not register them at all. Nietzsche does not give a theory of truth, but rather limits the scope of such theories anew. It is only in the most recent Nietzsche discussion that it becomes clear how this leeway has been filled step by step, largely independently of Nietzsche and in a different terminology, and it deserves a detailed treatise to show that his basic decisions in determining the truth have not yet been overtaken, perhaps not even been achieved.4 For the time being, I will only try to use a few guiding terms from Nietzsche to make these basic decisions visible in their radicality from the metaphysical tradition in view of the common concepts of truth in the 20th century

2The guidelines in Nietzsche's discussion of the truth topic stick to it Truth and lie in a non-moral sense essentially through to the late estate, so that, like Granier, I can dispense with a chronological differentiation. I am based on an estate notation from the spring of 1880:

What is new about our current position on philosophy is a conviction that no age has had: that we do not have the truth. All previous people “had the truth”: even the skeptics. (Estate 1880, 3 [19]), KSA 9.52)

3The following is required:

  1. It makes truth the core question of philosophy.
  2. It claims the loss of truth and with it a completely new situation for philosophy in the present.
  3. Nevertheless, it sticks to the possibility of philosophy and its truth - Nietzsche mentions it in the Second Untimely Consideration “The truest of all sciences” (HL 5).
  4. It ties the possibility of having the truth to certain earlier ages, thus making it a historical, a historically outdated concept.
  5. As an expression of a conviction, it also makes a claim to truth, albeit a conditional one.

4True thus becomes ambiguous, including its own negation. It can only be understood from its history, from the examination of tradition, which Nietzsche summarizes under the term metaphysics. The course of the investigation is thus sketched out: I start from the determination of truth in metaphysics and its "genealogy" (A), then I explain some of Nietzsche's basic concepts for the redefinition of truth, as they arise from his examination of metaphysics (B. ). In conclusion (C) I summarize his determination of truth in six criteria and point out its contact with current philosophical currents.

5Nietzsche calls himself, when he questions the “value of truth”, a “godless and anti-metaphysicist” - belief in truth is “belief in a metaphysical value” (GM III 24); it belongs to the “psychology of Metaphysics “(Nachlass 1887, 8 [2], KSA 12.327). The truth of philosophy and science, which is expressed in judgments with the claim to permanent validity, is originally tied to metaphysics, metaphysics Has the truth in its judgments, it has tangible before it as a “true world” that “finally becomes a fable”, turns out to be a “story of an error” that begins with Plato and only ends with Nietzsche (GD, How the “true World "finally became a fable). This end, however, owes to its beginning: Nietzsche sketches the picture of a logical process in which the truth of metaphysics, a “very high level of education”, the “best results of humanity so far” (MA I 20), is canceled out becomes. Occidental metaphysics and the Christian religion produce in a “two-thousand-year discipline” (GM III 27) to clarify their “dogmas” “the strict method of truth” that modern man now has “in his heart and head” (MA I 109) that he, "educated to sacrifice all desirability to truth" (GM I 1), finally recognize dogmas as such and from an attitude of "truthfulness" (JGB 1, FW 357) - Nietzsche also calls them " intellectual righteousness ”(AC 12),“ virtue ”of“ honesty ”(Za I, Von den Hinterweltlern),“ intellectual ”or“ intellectual conscience ”(FW 2. 335) - has to give up

6This conceptual field of truth, true world and truthfulness exceeds, without Nietzsche defining it in a coherent conceptual way, the theoretical approach to judgment as it was first suggested by Aristotle in the writings of Organon has performed. Anyone who, like Nietzsche, determines truth as a value cannot meaningfully hold on to its distinction between theoretical and practical. The conceptual field of practical truth, however, includes that of theoretical, and it is again Aristotle who makes it in VI. Book of his Nicomachean Ethics has mapped out. Even if Nietzsche mostly appears only as a moralist and author of poetics, at best as a logician and methodologist and as a historian of philosophy, the connection between his practical determination of truth still offers the best reference for our investigation

7 According to Aristotle, truth is "work" (érgon) of man, his "reason" (nûs; 1139 a 29, b 12), thus not simply something originally given, but rather the achievement of "truthfulness"aletheúein; 1139 b 13, 15; 1140 a 18). It can reveal what is true or even disguise it. Nietzsche seems to have this targeted production in mind when he speaks of the “method of truth”.

8The truth can lead to a decisive attitude that enables decision-making in individual cases (héxis proairetiké) and develop a peculiar ability (areté) acquire (1139 b 12-13) - Nietzsche's "Truthfulness" or "Virtue of Righteousness" .8

9Despite its methodological moment, Aristotle does not regard truths simply as a skill (téchne), whose destination (télos) man can determine himself and for his own sake. Rather, the goal of truthfulness is already determined by the thing, namely to show beings as they show themselves, i.e. H. - in Nietzsche's words - as the "true" or in its entirety as the "true world". For Aristotle, truth is only actually true when it cannot be otherwise, i.e. necessary, eternal and therefore teachable (1139 b 20 ff.). 9 The structure of truth therefore includes a certain attitude of man, his behavior resulting from it and something originally given to him. It leaves room for maneuver to define the moments of truth in different ways. The extent to which it is already metaphysical will have to be shown later.

10We can now follow Nietzsche himself in how metaphysics determines truth more precisely. Within the philosophy of the 19th century, he took the most radical position on metaphysics and thus redefined its concept. I am trying to get the main features of his concept of metaphysics from the section "The" Reason "in Philosophy" (No. 5 and 6) from the Twilight of the Idols to outline.

11There it is said that the “prejudice of reason” “formerly” took “the change, the change, the becoming in general as evidence of appearance” and “from the contradiction” to it “unity, identity, duration, substance, cause, thingness, Being ”set as the“ true world ”. (1) Unity, identity, duration, cause, thingness, being are easy to recognize as the traditional moments of the concept of substance. As a reason (arché), substance is that on which everything else, but which itself does not depend on anything else, i.e. that which is independent or unconditional. According to Nietzsche, metaphysics is the “derivation of the conditioned from the unconditional” (Nachlass 1883, 8 [25], KSA 10.342). (2) It grasps what is unconditional with reason, according to Nietzsche it is a "reason prejudice" (GD, Die "Vernunft", 5) or belongs to the "basic fictions" of thinking (Nachlass 1883, 8 [25]) , KSA 10.342). “Thinking”, “Reason”, “Consciousness” “sees perpetrators and actions everywhere: that believes in will as a cause in general; that believes in the 'I', in the I as being, in the I as substance and projects the belief in the I-substance onto all things - only with this does it create the concept of 'thing' "(GD, Die" Reason ”, 5). Substance is the object of reason, be it as something originally to be added for reason, as in Aristotle (dektikón; Met. Λ 7, 1072 b 22, de an. Γ 4, 429 a 15), or as necessary to be designed of set by reason, as since Descartes, who made reason itself an excellent substance. As a productively positing substance, this rational substance has the basic trait of will; insofar as it posits the whole of beings by itself, it is will to unity, wholeness, to the system (Nachlass 1887/88, 11 [99], KSA 13.47). In the concept of the system, according to Kant (KrV A 322, 680, 832 ff.) The rational unity of the totality of conditions, the unconditioned in the thing itself is preserved in modern philosophy, and Hegel thinks it through to the end (3) The unconditional is of course not already given to human reason, but only given up; it is the measure towards which it, like all other beings, aligns itself: purpose (télos). This results in a hierarchy of beings according to the standard of absolute independence, with the divine at the top, to which human reason comes closest. Hegel:

The appearance as if the spirit was mediated by something else is canceled out by the spirit itself, since it - so to speak - has the sovereign ingratitude to cancel and mediate what it seems to be mediated by, to something that exists only through it and in this way make yourself completely independent. (Encyclopedia 1830, § 381, addendum)

12 Nietzsche sums up: “We must have been divine, because we have reason!” (GD, Die “Vernunft”, 5).

According to Nietzsche, the structure of metaphysics from Plato to Hegel can be understood as an entanglement of the terms unconditional reason, substance, reason and telos. According to this, the true shows itself in the unconditioned qua reasonable, be it originally given or necessary to construct, in any case as unchangeable, self-contained and therefore understandable without contradictions, which ultimately - explicitly for Descartes and Leibniz, for example - remains bound to something divine. 11 According to the metaphysical determination of truth, man behaves as unconditional reason to an unconditional rational in order to bring it to himself as such. To that extent, he “has” the truth by holding it as the “true world” and thus has it at his disposal, over beings as a whole as a system, man as I, d. H. as self-confidence and freedom of will, history as a goal-oriented process, for Nietzsche all in “false reification” (Nachlass 18885/86, 1 [62], KSA 12.26). And since the skeptics, when in doubt about its validity, cling to the scheme of disposing of objects, to reification, they too “have” the truth in their own way:

Even the opponents of the Eleates were still subject to the seduction of their concept of being: Democritus among others when he invented his atom ... (GD, Die "Vernunft", 5)

This metaphysics concept, which Nietzsche follows, allows metaphysics to be historically delimited as an epoch from Plato to Hegel, while Heidegger with his thesis that metaphysics means the interpretation of being not only of an unconditional, but also of any existing objective being as such and finally, on the whole, all thinking, including everyday and scientific, except one's own, makes the one forgotten and Nietzsche the last, most extreme metaphysician, because he “unconditionally” a new one in a “blinded extreme claim” in the will to power making power ”. 12 The decisive experience of Nietzsche and his time is precisely the dissolution of the binding nature of the unconditional, be it as an objective substance, as the unity and totality of the universe (Nachlass 1886/87, 7 [62], KSA 12.317) or in the form of the divine (FW 343). Nietzsche thinks this experience as nihilism, as the devaluation of the highest values ​​(Nachlass 1887, 9 [35], KSA 12.350-352), thus recognizes values ​​in unconditional reason and its “true world”: “The point of view of 'worth' is that Viewpoint of conditions for maintenance and enhancement with regard to complex structures of relative duration of life within becoming ”(Nachlass 1887/88, 11 [73], KSA 13.36). Value has the threefold sense of created and reified value, the use value for other things (life) and the lasting need: man has created the “true world” and reified it out of the need to gain support in his life. With this, however, the possibility of unconditional truth is seen through as a condition-dependent and therefore as error and deception, the "world" "a de-divine, stupid, blind, crazy and questionable world" (FW 357). Truth can no longer be thought of in terms of the unconditioned (substance, reason, telos) and no longer according to the method of the unconditioned, the systematic deduction from a principle.

15But through this, only a certain form of truth is initially dissolved, not even its structure as a person's attitude to relate to a given in such a way that he brings it to himself as such. It must be redefined from the attitude of truthfulness, which remains the sole ground of truth, from the historical overcoming of its metaphysical definition.

16In Thus spoke zarathustra Nietzsche makes a first approach to the constructive foundation of philosophy from the leading terms body, life, will to power, revaluation of all values, superman and eternal return. The section “Of those who despise the body” first exposes the terms body, life, self and will to power. They are initially sufficient to lay the foundations for the redefinition of the truth.

17Nietzsche proceeds in this section in such a way that he criticizes the metaphysical terms “soul”, “I”, “spirit”, “reason” without sharply demarcating them, for their mutual dependence on prerequisites, their conditionality. He wants to “finally bring to light the conditions on which the movement of reason rests” (Nachlass 1886/87, 7 [63], KSA 12.317). So “soul is only a word for something in the body”, but the body with its self is dwelling and “powerful master” of “thoughts and feelings”, of the “I ruler” and “creator of the spirit”. The fact that the spirit springs from the body, the body embraces and rules its actions, does not mean, however, that the body is now ground (ark) and has become substance in the metaphysical sense, but the mind is only a dependent accident. As “work and toy”, the goals of its actions are determined by the body; it has no telos in itself: “What the sense feels, what the spirit recognizes, never ends in itself” (Za I, Von the despisers of the body). His thinking, his logic, is deprived of its originality and "apparent [] autocracy" (JGB 3; cf. JGB 16, 17). But as a tool it remains at the same time differentiated from the body, its “little reason” has its peculiar structure, its own logic

In his construction for overcoming metaphysical concepts, Nietzsche sticks to the concept of reason, but extends it to the “great reason” of the body. If we adhere to Kant's stipulation (KrV A 322) that reason is the ability to think the totality of conditions into an unconditional, then the body, the great reason, in it the abilities of the spirit, the small reason, must surpass and embrace : "This whole phenomenon 'body' is measured according to an intellectual measure of our consciousness, our 'spirit', our conscious thinking, feeling, wanting as superior to algebra as the multiplication table" (Nachlass 1885, 37 [4], KSA 11.577). The body measures “according to total usefulness, total harmfulness”, which are indicated by “feelings of pleasure and displeasure” (Nachlass 1887/88, 11 [71], KSA 13.34); it regulates its functions in dealing with the world with a wealth of information and a rapidity in its processing that consciousness would not be capable of. And he also determines the sequence of thoughts: “That one thought would be the direct cause of another thought is only apparent. The actually linked happening takes place below our consciousness ”(Nachlass 1885/86, 1 [61], KSA 12.26). The ideas of the body are caught in the rules of logic.

19The body that carries consciousness and gives it to think about is, for its part, far from being the original, unconditional ground. On the one hand, it is only "the best simile" for an opaque, complex variety of "those smallest living beings which constitute our body" (Nachlass 1885, 37 [4], KSA 11.577), and on the other hand, it is conditioned by the "world" , the "Dasein" (FW 374), the "Reality" (Nachlass 1887/88, 11 [99], KSA 13.48), is continuously interwoven with it. But “reality” is not an ultimate fact either; it is again only through one body, i. H. to be grasped in perspective: "Rather, the world has once again become" infinite "for us: insofar as we cannot reject the possibility that it includes infinite interpretations" (FW 374). The world is always called an individual lifeworld, and the individuality of a body - or what we call “body” (Nachlass 1885, 37 [4], KSA 11.577) - lies in its peculiar entanglement, in its functional connection with the world as a whole, which in principle do not perceive themselves as a self-contained, d. H. can be made an object: "Once again the great shudder grabs us - but who would want to divine this monster from an unknown world immediately in the old way?" (FW 374) So the structure of the unconditional arché dissolves into one at all Entanglement of equally original moments: body and world mutually condition each other in the more original event of world determination, which is no longer tied to fixed poles or a supreme authority, but can only be understood in its individual accomplishments:

It seems important to me to get rid of the universe, the unity, some force, an unconditional; one would not be able to avoid taking it as the highest authority and baptizing God. One has to split up the universe; unlearn respect for space; What we have given to the unknown and the whole take back for what is next, ours. (Estate 1886/87, 7 [62], KSA 12.317) 14

20 Nietzsche thinks of the entanglement and mutual conditioning of body and world in terms of the self. Self is called the placing of the body in relation to itself under the conditions of its world; it abolishes the ego's abstract self-referentiality. Nietzsche speaks of the self as a “higher overarching intellect []” in whose service “the conscious self is only a tool” (Nachlass 1883/84, 24 [16], KSA 10.654), a superordinate “center of all individuation “(Estate 1887, 7 [9], KSA 12.295). The self is both arbitrary as consciousness and conditioned as body.

21The concept of the body and its entanglement with the world in the self finally leads to the concept of life, the last and at the same time fundamental concept in the construction in the section “Of the despisers of the body”. “Within the language of philosophy”, the concept of life means “the experience of an objective object from which the subject cannot distinguish itself and, on the other hand, fails in its conception of itself as a pure, transcendental 'mind.” 15' Life 'is that which everything conditions, including that which it itself conditions or means to condition such as consciousness or reason; In this conditioned-conditioned-being it remains opaque to consciousness or reason. In that reason grasps itself as life, it includes itself in this conditioned-conditioning-being, without therefore being identical with it; besides, it cannot be sufficiently different from life. Nietzsche puts it this way:

One understands that one is being fooled and yet has no power not to be fooled. (Estate 1886/87 [June 10, 1887], 5 [71] 5, KSA 12.213)

22In this way he redefines the relationship between reason and life vis-à-vis Aristotle and the metaphysical tradition. 16 Aristotle, too, applies reason as a moment in life, but it is characterized by the fact that it behaves independently, unconditionally, towards it chorismós comes to. At first it connects with other moments such as growth, nutrition, change of location and perception (de an. 413 a 22-25) to the concept of life. Its basic definition as physis is to have the origin and goal of movement in oneself. This origin manifests itself in the individual living being as soul (psyche). It is the basis of the movement of an individual material body, and as such it remains with priority over what is founded, over the body. The different moments of life are - according to the metaphysical criterion of unconditional independence - to be classified the higher, the more independence they allow the living.

23 Reason (nûs) shows itself to be the highest possibility of life, that everything else in its essential determinateness (eîdos) and can thus create the greatest leeway and the most comprehensive hold in beings. Since, unlike the other moments of life, it has no organically identifiable organ, it must be independent of the body (429 a 25 – b 5).

In this way, life releases reason as unconditional and thereby becomes capable of truth, of distancing reason from the given and freely allowing general orders to apply and exist, the knowledge of which is not conditioned by the individual living and not restricted in principle. But if the living also has the goal of its movement in itself, it is entelécheia, lives and grows according to a given goal (télos), his growth and behavior always has limits (péras) and measure (lógos; 416 a 16-17), namely again the measure of becoming independent and that means in the extreme, eternal and divine (415 b 1-7) and therefore unconditional in being. This measure, which is first found in the essential determinacy (eîdos) shows the biological species, remains in the change of individuals, guides their becoming and is therefore independent and priority over them, again a universal being that is unconditional for them. It is this unconditional general that eîde, grasps reason in its truths. In this way it also gains its excellent independence from everything connected with the body from the point of view of its truthfulness. In the end it experiences its highest independence in the fact that it grasps what is in the highest degree independent, the divine. This divine is an “eternal, best living thing” (Met. Λ 7, 1072 b 29), his life is only a condition of himself and everything else, free of all possibility, contingency, conditionality, life in a heightened sense of the original Being conditioned leaves behind.

25Nietzsche no longer allows reason to be unconditional in relation to life. He no longer grasps life, prepared by Hegel, only in terms of its possibilities for independence, but also as appropriating and overpowering the other. He gives "a new definition of the term" life "as the will to power" (Nachlass 1886/87, 7 [54], KSA 12.313):

Life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overcoming what is foreign and weaker, oppression, hardship, imposing one's own forms, incorporation and at least, at the least, exploitation (JGB 259).

Also reason or the spirit, as a moment of life and "tool of the body", has this "constricting, taming, domineering and really lordly will", the "intention [...] to incorporate new" experiences "[...] So growth ”(JGB 230). But just as little as he or she is a simple, self-contained and sharply demarcated from other things (JGB 16-19), the will to power can be seen as the “essence of the living” (JGB 259), as Wolfgang Müller-Lauter has shown has to understand 17 as one and uniform, as originally general and unconditional ground of all beings, he constitutes an “un-determinable”, an inherently diverse set of conditions. It is not tied to a general, even unconditional measure, and therefore individuals do not strive in their growth and behavior to maintain such a general:

Against the theory that the individual has the advantage of the species, of his progeny, in view, at the expense of his own advantage: that is only an illusion (Nachlass 1886/87, 7 [9], KSA 12.295).

27They are “force quanta, the essence of which is to exert power over all other force quanta” (Nachlass 1888, 14 [81], KSA 13.261). When Nietzsche speaks of “unconditionality in everything 'will to power'” (JGB 22), it does not mean that “laws […] prevail” in him, but rather that “absolutely the laws are absent”: “if something like that and if nothing else happens, there is no 'principle', no 'law', no 'order' ”(Nachlass 1888, 14 [81], KSA 13.261).

28 Now, if Darwin saw the historicity of the general in biological life, the limit of his philosophical significance for Nietzsche lies in the fact that he is on télos the preservation of the species to which the individual remains subject. This télos However, according to Nietzsche, it shows its limit at the latest when it comes to the phenomenal findings of human reality: (1) With the unrivaled domination of human beings over nature and through their chastisement by means of metaphysical Christian morality, the natural selection mechanisms are changed and increasingly switched off. Man no longer needs to fight for the preservation of his species. It is no longer a matter of depth and malice, “the two basic forms of the previous superiority of man over other things” (GM I 6), but under the rule of the spirit the weak, good and superficial become powerful: “Darwin has the spirit forget [...], the weak have more spirit ... "(GD, Streifzüge 14)," the means of the weak to keep themselves above are instincts, have become 'humanity', are 'institutions' ... "(estate 1888, 14 [137], KSA 13.). (2) The “basic life instinct” of the human being is initially “expansion of power”, yes “bliss [...] in danger”, and only in the borderline case “self-preservation” (FW 349, cf. JGB 224, 13). (3) He can and must shape the future of his kind on his own responsibility (JGB 203, 208, 251). Life “is able”, as it is called towards the end of Zarathustra's speech “Of those who despise the body”, “to create beyond itself”. (4) The "expansion of power" (FW 349) in the shaping of the future of man is based on strong individuals who, however, are successfully and permanently fought down by the multitude of the weak with the help of morality, so that a contradiction between the types based on the criteria of strength and duration (Nachlass 1886/87, 7 [25], KSA 12.304 f.).

The general has no right to assert itself as the unconditional measure of the individual, to claim independence and priority over it. Reason cannot differ from life as unconditional - which it does not touch in its function of establishing and holding on to the general:

How must man, in order to dispose of the future in such a way, first have learned to separate the necessary from the accidental occurrence, to think causally, to see the distant as present, and to anticipate with certainty what is the end, what is the means to it, in general? to calculate, to be able to calculate (GM II 1).

As a 'philosopher of life', Nietzsche in no way misunderstood the meaning of the general. 18

With this, the basic decisions for Nietzsche's new definition of truth have now been made. The structure of man takes on that of life, to be a multifaceted, ultimately impenetrable set of conditions and in it the will for appropriation and enhancement, which as a self expands more and more in perspective. His truth is therefore no longer a behavior towards what is originally given or necessarily posited, but rather overcoming what is always already through itself, but also through other conditioned things that are constantly shifting. But this becomes the Aristotelian structure the truth - and not just its metaphysical definition - overcome. The truth becomes an event that - on the side of the human being as well as the given - loses its solidity, its hold and can no longer be understood as a decidable behavior between permanent relata. Becoming human and given epistemological radically distanced, “there is no such thing as truth” (Nachlass 1885/86, 2 [108], KSA 12.114).

But then the question is: “Not how is the error possible, […] but: how is a kind of truth possible at all despite the fundamental untruth in knowledge?” (Nachlass 1881, 11 [325], KSA 9.568). By being human and given ontological come together in the concept of life:

Finally: our idealistic fantasy also belongs to existence and must appear in its character! It is not the source, but that is why it is there. Our highest and most daring thoughts are character pieces of 'reality'. Our thoughts are of the same substance as all things. (Estate 1881, 12 [11], KSA 9.578)

The ontological unity creates a new scope and a new standard for truth. If the human being uses the tool of his reason to distance himself from his conditions, to objectify them and to fix them in order, he can thereby design a picture of his future towards which he can shape it, i.e. control the enhancement of his life and d. H. in turn can increase. His freedom is no longer understood from an unconditional practical reason, but is set as "positive power, as the will to power" (preliminary stage to GD, Streifzüge 38 f., KSA 14.431), as creating leeway through and to increase: “Creating freedom to create new things” (Za I, From the three metamorphoses). Freedom becomes an occurrence in which it can increase, hold, but also decay, and according to Nietzsche, truths belong in this occurrence, as a conditional and ultimately opaque, but successful behavior from the attitude of truthfulness:

“Truth” is therefore not something that would be there and that could be found or discovered - but something that can be created and that gives the name for a process, even more for a will to overwhelm, which in itself has no end : Put truth into it as a processus in infinitum, an active determination, not an awareness of something that would be "in itself" fixed and determined. It is a word for the “will to power” (Nachlass 1887, 9 [91], KSA 12.385).

Truth constitutes such an extreme possibility of (conditional) freedom, namely, to overcome the will to see through the ever-overgrown living conditions and thereby to create (new, more strongly conditioned, i.e. conditional) freedom.

The first criterion of the truth of the judgment, the correspondence to the thing, returns in this determination on a higher level: truths as a moment of life are true if it corresponds to its basic determination, the will to power, to be enhancement. But even this truth still knows itself as a conditional interpretation (JGB 22). Also "every philosophy may be seen as a remedy and aid to growing or declining life" (NW, We Antipodes), even the truths of philosophy, if it runs counter to its living conditions, can fall prey to self-deception (JGB 230). Above all, “the ultimate truth of the flow of things does not tolerate incorporation, ours organs (to live) are prepared for error ”(Nachlass 1881, 11 [162], KSA 9.504). And on the other hand, truth cannot give up “thinkability” and language even in full awareness of its necessary self-deception as its conditions (cf. Za II, On the blissful islands; Nachlass 1886/87, 5 [22], 12.193 f.). Even if it has seen through logic and language, as they have historically emerged, as means of calculation, relief, reification and falsification of life (cf. Nachlass 1885, 38 [4], KSA 11.598; Nachlass 1887, 9 [97 ], KSA 12.389-391; Nachlass 1888, 14 [153], KSA 13.336-338; Nachlass 1888, 18 [13], KSA 13.535 f.), It remains, if it wants to “put truth into things” at all, thinking Arrested “in the linguistic form” (Nachlass 1886/87, 5 [22], 12.193 f.).

In this way one will not be able to define the truth in a binding manner if one does not want to make logic its ultimate determinant again. We do not get beyond a shift in the “horizon lines of our knowledge” (Nachlass 1886/87, 5 [3], KSA 12.185) and “strong counter-concepts” (Nachlass 1888, 23 [3] 3, KSA 13.603). We can only explain the concept of truth, in the Kantian sense, by specifying “only a few features” which “are sufficient to distinguish”, so that “the concept [...] never stands between certain boundaries” and “a lot of dark ideas may contain ”(KrV A 727 f.).

I explain it according to six criteria in order to distinguish it, following the estate fragment quoted at the beginning, from the concept of truth in metaphysics from its overcoming according to the developed concepts of life, self, freedom, corporeality, perspectivity and enhancement. Truth always means first of all truths, only secondarily érgon, Insights, judgments. The criteria are not arranged in a 'phenomenology of truth' in the sense of Hegel's phenomenology of spirit, a step-by-step and consistent overcoming of determinations that are presupposed to be true but prove to be untrue, so that an ultimate truth of truth emerges. They open up perspectives that are intertwined with one another. According to the first three criteria the traditional determinations are negated, according to the following criteria they are preserved together with their negation. The preservation of negativity, the “opposite character”, is the basic idea of ​​Nietzsche's redefinition of the truth, the readiness to understand “the other side of things as necessary” (Nachlass 1887, 10 [111], KSA 12.519).

38 (1) That is truths not necessarily, but conditionally - life. It understands itself as conditioned and conditioned from the structure of conditions of life:

an in-itself, an unconditional […] cannot be recognized: otherwise it would not be unconditional […] recognizing means “placing oneself in the condition of something”: feeling conditioned by something […] - - it is therefore among everyone Establishing circumstances, designating, making conditions conscious (not exploring beings, things, “in-itself”) (Nachlass 1885/86, 2 [154], KSA 12.141 f.).

The insight into being conditioned-conditioned as a moment of truth has prevailed in contemporary philosophy, especially in the discussion of Kant. While Kant still clung to the transcendental a priori under the conditions of sensuality, today it is recognized as conditional in Popper's falsificationism and in analytic philosophy, especially by Quine. Putnam, although without referring to Nietzsche, has gone so far as to “make all of our standards of rational acceptability, justification and ultimately truth dependent on similarity standards that are obviously a product of our biological and cultural heritage” .19 In the anthropological conception of reason as a compensation for openness to the world, in evolutionary epistemology, in the hermeneutic theorem of the history of effects, in existential truth as the fulfillment of individual existence and in the approach of critical theory, truth always appears as - albeit from different sides - in principle conditional. “Philosophy has become anti-priorityistic. [She has] recognized [...] that most of what we consider to be truth a priori is contextual and relative in character ”.20

40 (2) That is truths not immobile, but historical - self. In its conditioned being, the truth sees itself exposed to changeable living conditions, exposed to history. It therefore does not seek to establish truth as unmoved, but rather reflects it anew from the respective living conditions, thus exposing it to the movement of the self in its world. Philosophical hermeneutics and existential philosophy, in particular, take their historicity as inescapable and, under a shadow of tragedy, make it their own affair.21 Nietzsche himself want the mobility of truth, seeks the variety of its conditions consciously, almost with relish:

When I wanted to enjoy the truth, I invented lies and appearances - the near and far, the past and the future, the perspective. Then I put the darkness and the deception in myself and made myself a deception in front of myself. (Estate 1882/83, 5 [1] 244, KSA 10.216)

With Thomas S. Kuhn, the historicity of truth finally also asserts itself in the scientific theory of the natural sciences. For Nietzsche, however, paradigms of 'normal science' already succumbed to self-delusion, already every kind of belief and conviction annihilated the movement of the self and alienated it: "Every kind of belief is itself an expression of self-alienation, of self-alienation" (AC 54), and in this sense "convictions [...] are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies." (MA I 483; cf. AC 55)

Instead of belief, which is no longer possible for us, we put a strong will above us, which holds a preliminary series of basic estimates, as a heuristic principle: to see how far one can get with it. (Estate 1884, 25 [307], KSA 11.89)

Not only cannot it be expected from such hypotheses that they can be definitively or even approximately confirmed - as Popper still suggests - their truth is measured - with all the rigor of research22 - not simply according to their validation against facts of experience, but in advance especially according to which possibilities of knowing and acting they open up under the respective experienced conditions - and this also includes 'facts'. Nietzsche is not only advocating a pragmatic concept of truth in order to ward off the metaphysical concept of truth -

That which corresponds to the necessary living conditions of the time, of the group will always prevail as “truth”: in the long run the sum of opinions will be incorporated into humanity, in which they are of their greatest use d. H. has the option of the longest duration. (Estate 1881, 11 [262], KSA 9.541) -,

But it goes decidedly beyond him. He does not stop at the criterion of utility (Nachlass 1887, 9 [38], KSA 12.352), which also allows for (useful) convictions, but rather

that every elevation of people entails overcoming narrower interpretations, that every strengthening and expansion of power that has been achieved opens up new perspectives and means believing in new horizons - this goes through my writings. (Estate 1885/86, 2 [108], KSA 12.114, corr.). 23

44 (3) Truths is so essentially called itself in freedom set and, since this creates new living conditions, reinterpret, reevaluate ‘. In the freedom of truth there is truth not originally given, but created, or: not the given, but the created is true.

45 Man has become aware that he decides for himself within the scope he has created about the standards of truth:

The new courage - no a priori truths [...] but free submission to a ruling thought that has its time [...] (Nachlass 1884, 25 [211], KSA 11.69)

The decision-making character of truth, which has nothing to do with arbitrariness, has been confirmed not only in philosophy, but also in the sciences on a broad front, and after their fundamental crises in the 19th and 20th centuries also in mathematics and physics

47The absoluteness of truth as unconditioned, unmoved and originally given is thereby dissolved; Nietzsche, on the other hand, preserves the traditional determinations of the conscious, the general and the non-contradicting - together with their negation.

48 (4) That is truths conscious and bodily at the same time - corporeality. When the great reason of the body itself is a truth that not only reveals far more, but, under the aspect of being useful to life, far more surely than consciousness, so that the consciousness, which is multifaceted in itself, is almost “against the innumerable multiples in the experiences of these many Consciousness must remain protected and closed ”(Nachlass 1885, 37 [4], KSA 11.578), then the truth, if it consciously wants to free itself from such immunizations and become“ sovereign ”, is in a twofold movement: On the one hand, it creates the physical consciously and thus decomposes his instincts and habits in order to be able to shape it on his own, and on the other hand, incorporates such consciously made orientations in order to come to new instinct-safe habits. An “inherited habit” gives way “under the influence of growing knowledge” to a “new habit” (MA I 107): that means to continue the enlightenment (M 197), but also to escape its “ridiculous overestimation and misunderstanding of consciousness” and thus the “task of absorbing knowledge and making it instinctive” (FW 11). Nietzsche wants more than Gehlen in his anthropology, he not only wants to see the consciousness relieved in order to keep it viable in its cosmopolitanism, but "that a higher body is formed" (Nachlass 1883/84, 24 [16], KSA 10.655) , "The sovereign individual", for whom the "proud knowledge of the extraordinary privilege of responsibility [...] has sunk to its lowest depths" (GM II 2).

49 (5) The consciousness that grows out of and with the reason of its body opens up conditions and possibilities for the whole of life, but always in perspective. The Perspectivity constitutes the world as each individual: “A different world belongs to every soul; for every soul every other soul is a world behind ”(Za III, The convalescent 2). The (big with the small) reason has before it an empirically - individually and historically - experienceable whole with a largely incorporated network of orders and values, for the most part not explicitly and not completely explicable. It allows for obscurities and contradictions within itself; its order cannot and does not need to be logically and systematically derived from a principle. Reason is not only the always already general, itself completely transparent and the world logically determining scientific reason: the world is at the same time designed by an individual, heterogeneous, opaque reason in truth, depending on the individual and heterogeneous whole

However, perspectivity does not exclude communication and consensus in uniform coincidences: it leaves at the same time general and individual truths to. General truth becomes possible through the mediation of individual perspectives under common (for Nietzsche always already moral) interests or through the (again morally conditioned) recognition of the stipulations of others. Nietzsche expresses the "assumption [...] that consciousness at all only developed under the pressure of the need to communicate" - "not [the] reason, but only [the] becoming conscious [] of the reason". It will therefore "only ever bring the non-individual [in the individual] to consciousness [...], its, average '", "only a surface and symbolic world [...], a generalized, a generalized world" (FW 354 ) .26 This “genius of the genus”, however, once established, reveals the world in a peculiar and autonomous manner in its (our) logic and can develop into the “prevailing prejudice” of a “moral ontology” (estate 1886 / 87, 7 [4], KSA 12.265) whose self-evident fact makes us forget their origin and character. Despite all the criticism of the traditional independence of the general, Nietzsche strongly opposes making the individual an original starting point. The individual is always already determined not only by his individual world, but this, and thus himself, is interpreted and recorded by conceptual generalities:

In truth there are no individual truths, but only individual errors - the individual himself is an error [...], a "unity" that does not stand up. (Estate 1881, 11 [7], KSA 9.442 f .; cf. Estate 1887/88, 11 [73], KSA 13.36 f.).
The term "individual" is wrong. (Estate 1885, 34 [123], KSA 11.462).

51 In this way a priority cannot be established for either the general or the individual. They stand in multiple entanglements that philosophy (including Nietzsche himself) has not yet adequately clarified. In the context of the philosophy of science of the natural sciences, Popper has shown the mutual dependency of theoretical design and observation and, for the sciences of society and history, Dilthey first showed that ontologically everything general is to be grasped as individual and in understanding everything individual is to be grasped generally valid. Perhaps the most advanced here is the philosophy of language, which has to start from the “basic fact of human linguistic quality”, that in communication, general meaning identity is presupposed, i. H. must be accepted as true, but at the same time "with the opposite assumption that a possible" different understanding "of the other can also be assumed without being able to delimit an" area "or even a" core "of identical understanding a priori." 27

52 (6) When it comes to general truths, it lays itself on according to the rules of logic and language Consistency down firmly, necessarily in contradiction with its individual conditionality and lively movement. It can have this existential ‘ Contradiction just overcome it by yourself to a new standard increases, the justice. Truths as a moment in life seeks enhancement itself; as the will to truth, there is a will to power. So it becomes ambiguous. On the one hand, it wants to gain stability, and the "sense of truth [is] basically the sense of security" (M 26), a symptom of weakness and thus a contradiction to the essence of life as an extension of power, it falls into "blind trust in Reason ", which wants to open up a true, unconditional, contradicting, existent world:

This world is apparent - consequently there is a true world.

This world is conditioned - consequently there is an unconditional world.

This world is full of contradictions - consequently there is a world without contradictions.

This world is becoming - consequently there is a world that is.

Lots of wrong conclusions (blind trust in reason […]) (Nachlass 1887, 8 [2], KSA 12.327).

On the other hand, the will to truth wants to overcome the hold of the usual self-deception, and so the “truth” has a “negative character” - “as the removal of an error, an illusion” (Nachlass 1884, 25 [165], KSA 11.58).But even for this overcoming that preserves vitality, "the world [...] is not a fact, but [...] an ever-changing falsehood that never approaches the truth: because - there is no 'truth'." (Estate 1885 / 86, 2 [108], KSA 12.114) Even as overcoming truths remain in contradiction. Overcoming a hold as the truth of the will to truth always presupposes a hold that has to be overcome - untrue - and so we have to “admit untruth as a condition of life” (JGB 4; cf. Nachlass 1885, 34 [253], KSA 11.506) ), “The whole of human life is sunk deep into untruth” (MA I 34, cf. Nachlass 1881, 11 [162], KSA 9.503 f.).

Truth does not denote an opposition to error, but the position of certain errors in relation to other errors, for example that they are older, more deeply incorporated, that we do not know how to live without them, and the like. (Estate 1885, 34 [247], KSA 11.503)
This belief in truth comes to its ultimate consequence in us - you know what it is: - that if there is anything to be worshiped at all, it is the appearance that must be worshiped, that the lie - and not the truth - is divine is. ...? (Estate 1886/87, 6 [25], KSA 12.243)

54 In the constantly changing conditional structure of life, 'having' the truth means clinging to it, even denying its conditionality, inverting its structure, in motion, not being an object.28 Every speaker, every writer, but especially the one who writes Philosopher, who wants to trace everything that he grasps in its manifold conditionalities, without ever being able to summarize them, knows the agony of falsification that inevitably includes its fixation. Truth therefore demands, at least in the case of the “creative” philosopher (JGB 211), the willingness to move, to destroy the illusion, to fix it, to be able to have it.

The truth must move in the matter: it has its yardstick, as a conditional interpretation, not in the matter, but, as an interpretation of the matter, not in itself, but in overcoming its interpretations from the ever-unforeseeable new experience of the matter, in opening up perspectives.29 It does not escape its conditionality and appearance -

You should learn to understand the necessary injustice in every pros and cons, injustice as inseparable from life, life itself as conditioned by the perspective and its injustice. (MA, Vorr. 6) -,

But it rises to the best-justified "level of appearance" (JGB 34), to justice in Nietzsche's sense, a justice that, when it judges, at the same time in the variety of overcome and overcome perspectives the experience of the matter anew from the judgment Freed. 30 Justice, factual appropriateness with regard to the - always unconscious - whole of its - consciously moved - perspective optics, the objectivity that is still possible for us is the outermost limit of Nietzsche's redefinition of truth.

Here, however, the point has also been reached where philosophy exceeds the conditions of everyday life and scientific research, insofar as these meet the demands of the day and aim for personal or social benefit, material or knowledge gain, and they themselves too gets to the edge of their peculiar field. Nietzsche's philosophy reaches its extreme radicality here:

My philosophy - to pull people out of appearances at any risk! Also no fear of the perishing of life. (Estate 1881, 13 [12], KSA 9.620)

Not wanting to hold onto the truth, at least for the time being, can realistically only allow oneself a reflection that is relieved of concern for what is next and also leaves behind the philosophical task of developing a world orientation and ethics. Nietzsche also recognizes this: “Anyone who has looked deep into the world will guess what wisdom lies in the fact that people are superficial”, that they are “afraid of the truth” (JGB 59). Philosophy, which as the “truest of all sciences” must not begin to “believe in itself” (JGB 9), which is out for ruthless criticism and unreserved lack of prejudice, can and must, out of these special living conditions afford to unconditionally, if not necessarily, open up an aporia that they cannot close but must endure, can and must afford to deny themselves the truth as their goal in their will to truth. Because the truth is not only disguised as an object, already made into an ideal, a regulative idea: the “last idealists of knowledge, in whom only today the intellectual conscience dwells and became incarnate, - […] They are far from being free spirits : because they still believe in the truth ... "(GM III 24)

59Science must be in this "metaphysical belief"

60 assure “a value in itself of truth” and thus differs in principle from philosophy (GM III 24). But she must not even hold on to her "conviction" quoted at the beginning that she does not have the truth, because as a conviction it would already be wrong, would be resignation. If she gives it up, she must again know "that the destruction of an illusion does not yet produce any truth, but only a piece of ignorance, an expansion of our 'empty space', an increase in our inner 'desolation' -" (estate 1885, 35 [47], KSA 11.533, corr.).

61 The conclusion:

Knowledge in itself in becoming impossible; so how is knowledge possible? As an error about oneself, as a will to power, as a will to deceive. (Estate 1886/87, 7 [54], KSA 12.313)

62may not discourage a “positive spirit” from setting goals or “promising” (GM II 1), “setting the more probable in place of the more improbable, under certain circumstances, even if it precludes progress towards an a priori determined goal instead of an error, another ”(GM, Vorr. 4). The hurtful and crippling ambiguity in all philosophical truths, which must destroy ideals - including the ideal which it needs in order to destroy ideals - is reflected everywhere in the contemporary currents of philosophy, albeit in mild and tolerable forms, theirs Dogmas and sedatives have their doctrine.31 It is Nietzsche's merit to have not only revealed the contradiction in philosophical truths, which want to increase but denies progress, in unsurpassed radicalism, but at the same time to have illuminated them as insurmountable from overcoming metaphysics.